No. 19-50231

# In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

NIKISHNA POLEQUAPTEWA,

Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
The Honorable Cormac J. Carney, Presiding
No. CR-16-00036-CJC

# Appellant's Excerpts of Record [Volume 1 of 6]

CUAUHTEMOC ORTEGA Interim Federal Public Defender JAMES H. LOCKLIN Deputy Federal Public Defender 321 East 2nd Street Los Angeles, California 90012 213-894-2929

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant

# **Table of Contents**

# <u>Volume 1</u>

Order Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence	1
Transcript – Retrial – Day 5 – A.M. (Jury Instructions Only)	
<u>Volume 2</u>	
Indictment	27
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence [Filed February 2, 2018; Docket No. 33]	30
Government's Opposition to Motion to Suppress Evidence*	109
Defendant's Reply re Motion to Suppress Evidence [Filed April 23, 2018; Docket No. 37]	191
Government's Application re Evidentiary Hearing	197
Transcript – First Trial – Day 5 (Excerpt)	203
First Superseding Indictment [Filed August 29, 2018; Docket No. 106]	235
Joint Proposed Jury Instructions (Excerpt) [Filed October 10, 2018; Docket No. 116]	240

<sup>\*</sup> Documents marked with an asterisk have been redacted pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(5) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 49.1(a).

Transcript – Retrial – Day 1 - P.M. (Excerpt)	.244
[Dated November 6, 2018; Filed January 31, 2020; Docket Nos. 139, 202]	
<u>Volume 3</u>	
Transcript – Retrial – Day 2 – A.M	.292
Transcript – Retrial – Day 2 – P.M. [Dated November 7, 2018; Filed January 31, 2020; Docket Nos. 140, 203]	.414
<u>Volume 4</u>	
Transcript – Retrial – Day 3 – A.M	.580
Transcript – Retrial – Day 3 – P.M. [Dated November 8, 2018; Filed June 30, 2019; Docket Nos. 141, 184]	.716
<u>Volume 5</u>	
Transcript – Retrial – Day 4 – A.M. [Dated November 9, 2018; Filed January 31, 2020; Docket Nos. 142, 204]	.855
Transcript – Retrial – Day 4 – P.M. [Dated November 9, 2018; Filed January 31, 2020; Docket Nos. 142, 210]	1002
<u>Volume 6</u>	
Transcript – Retrial – Day 5 – A.M.*  [Dated November 13, 2018; Filed January 25, 2019; Docket Nos. 144, 159]	
Transcript – Retrial – Day 5 – P.M.	
[Dated November 13, 2018; Filed February 7, 2020; Docket Nos. 144, 214]	

Jury Instructions	1209
[Filed November 13, 2018; Docket No. 143]	
Selected Trial Exhibits (Nos. 66A, 84, and 98)	1237
Jury Note 1	1252
[Filed November 13, 2018; Docket No. 147 (Redacted Version)]	
Response to Jury Note 1	1253
[Filed November 13, 2018; Docket No. 148]	
Jury Note 2	1254
[Filed November 13, 2018; Docket No. 149 (Redacted Version)]	
Verdict	1255
[Filed November 13, 2018; Docket No. 151 (Redacted Version)]	
List of Exhibits and Witnesses	1258
[Filed November 13, 2018; Docket No. 153]	1236
т 1	1200
Judgment[Filed July 9, 2019; Docket No. 190]	1288
Notice of Appeal	1291
[Filed July 12, 2019; Docket No. 192]	
Docket	1298

	Case 8:16-cr-00036-CJC Document 39	Filed 05/04/18 Page 1 of 8 Page ID #:317
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		ES DISTRICT COURT
9		RICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	SOUTHI	ERN DIVISION
11		) Case No.: SACR 16-00036-CJC
13	LINITED STATES OF AMEDICA	Case No.: SACK 10-00050-CJC
14	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	{
15	Plaintiff,	ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE [33]
16	v.	) SUPPRESS EVIDENCE [33]
17	NIKISHNA POLEQUAPTEWA,	{
18	Defendant	}
19	Defendant.	}
20 21		)
22		
23	//	
24	//	
25	//	
26	//	
27	//	
28		
		-1-

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Nikishna Polequaptewa is charged with one count of unauthorized impairment of a protected computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)(i), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (Count One), arising out of Defendant's alleged transmission of computer information and files that damaged his former employer, Bluestone Strategy Group ("Bluestone"). (See generally Dkt. 36 [Opposition, hereinafter "Opp."].) Before the Court is Defendant's motion to suppress a laptop computer and evidence seized from that laptop pursuant to a search warrant. (Dkt. 33 [Motion, hereinafter "Mot."].) Defendant argues that the evidence should be suppressed because the Government allegedly searched Defendant's hotel room and seized the laptop without a warrant, that no exceptions to the warrant requirement apply, and that the affidavit supporting the subsequent search warrant failed to establish probable cause to search the laptop. (See generally id.) The Government argues that Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the laptop, which he stole from another former employer, the University of California Irvine ("UCI"). (Opp. at 1–4, 11–13.) For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.<sup>1</sup>

#### II. BACKGROUND

In the summer of 2012, Defendant was employed with UCI. (Dkt. 36-4 [Declaration of Nidavone Niravanh, hereinafter "Niravanh Decl."] ¶ 2.) On June 19, 2012, Defendant purchased a laptop using UCI funds allocated to Professor Kathleen Johnson ("the June laptop"). (Dkt. 36-5 [Declaration of Elizabeth Trammell, hereinafter "Trammell Decl."] ¶¶ 3–4, Ex. 1.) On July 9, 2012, Defendant purchased another laptop

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without a hearing. Accordingly, the hearing set for May 21, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. is hereby vacated and off calendar.

#### Case 8:16-cr-00036-CJC Document 39 Filed 05/04/18 Page 3 of 8 Page ID #:319

again using UCI funds allocated to Professor Johnson ("the July laptop"). (*Id.* ¶¶ 3–4, Ex. 2; Niravanh Decl. ¶ 2a, Ex. 1.) As an employee, Defendant's use and ownership interest in the June and July laptops were limited by UCI's policies. (Niravanh Decl. ¶ 2b, Ex. 2.)

On March 3, 2014, UCI terminated Defendant's employment after he was found to have violated the University's policy on sexual harassment. (*Id.* ¶ 2c, Ex. 3.) Defendant was required to return the June and July laptops at that time. (*Id.*) In his notice of dismissal, Defendant and his counsel were advised "You are directed to immediately return all UC equipment, including without limitation computers, laptops, cell phone[s], other electronic devices and audio-visual equipment that is in your possession." (*Id.* Ex. 3 at 2.) In August 2014, Defendant's wife returned the June laptop to UCI. (*Id.* ¶ 2d, Exs. 4, 5.) In January 2015, UCI sent Defendant and his wife letters regarding the outstanding return of the July laptop, and stated that the July laptop must be returned to UCI. (*Id.* ¶ 2e, Exs. 4, 5.) Since July 9, 2012, UCI has viewed the July laptop as its property, and now considers it stolen property. (*Id.* ¶ 3.) Defendant has not returned the July laptop to UCI. (*Id.*)

Sometime after his termination from UCI, Defendant began to work with Bluestone, a consulting firm in Irvine, California. (Dkts. 33 Ex. A [FBI Search Warrant] at 4, 33-1 [Declaration of Nikishna Polequaptewa, hereinafter "Polequaptewa Decl."] ¶ 2.) Initially, Defendant worked as an information technology ("IT") administrator, but on November 14, 2014, Bluestone relieved Defendant of his IT duties, as it had hired a third-party vendor to handle IT going forward. (FBI Search Warrant at 4–5.) Bluestone revoked Defendant's administrative access to the company's systems, and made Defendant a product strategist, the position for which he was originally hired. (*Id.*) On November 15, 2014, Defendant traveled to Florida for a business meeting. (*Id.* at 5; Polequaptewa Decl. ¶ 2.)

While in Florida on the evening of November 18, 2014, the Government alleges that Defendant began to delete Bluestone's digital files using the login of another Bluestone employee, William Moon, without authorization. (FBI Search Warrant at 6.) At 7:25 p.m., Defendant announced at a Bluestone client meeting that he was resigning from Bluestone. (*Id.*; Polequaptewa Decl. ¶ 3.) Immediately following his resignation, the Government alleges that Defendant continued to delete Bluestone's files, ultimately deleting approximately 200 files, which caused significant harm to Bluestone. (FBI Search Warrant at 6, 20–23; Dkt. 36-2.)

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Later that night when Bluestone learned that Defendant allegedly was deleting its files, Moon went to Defendant's hotel room with deputies from the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO"). (FBI Search Warrant at 9.) Moon told BSO Deputy Laughten Hall that Defendant was not responding to calls or knocks at his hotel room door, and that Defendant had deleted Bluestone files using what Moon believed was a company computer. (Dkt. 36-6 [Declaration of Deputy Laughten Hall, hereinafter "Hall Decl."] Ex. 1 at 3.) Moon also told Deputy Hall that he believed Defendant had Bluestone's computer in his hotel room. (Id.) Deputy Hall informed Moon that unless he had proof of ownership of the computer in question or Defendant voluntarily surrendered it, he could not remove the computer from the hotel room. (Id.) A deputy knocked on Defendant's hotel room door for about 10 to 15 minutes, with no response, (FBI Search Warrant at 9–10), but eventually Deputy Hall made contact with Defendant, (id.; Hall Decl. Ex. 1 at 3). The parties dispute whether Defendant or a deputy opened the door, whether Defendant voluntarily allowed Deputy Hall and other deputies to enter the hotel room, and whether Defendant voluntarily gave Deputy Hall his laptop. (Mot. at 8–13; Polegueptewa Decl.  $\P$  6–17; Opp. at 6–7.) The parties agree, however, that at some point Defendant handed over his laptop to Deputy Hall, who then handed the laptop to Moon. (Polegueptewa Decl. ¶¶ 16–17; Hall Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 1 at 3.)

# Case 8:16-cr-00036-CJC Document 39 Filed 05/04/18 Page 5 of 8 Page ID #:321

After Moon obtained the laptop, he did not open it and instead sent it to Bluestone's Irvine offices the morning of November 19, 2014. (FBI Search Warrant at 10–11.) On November 19, 2014, Defendant came to Bluestone's Irvine offices and demanded the laptop be returned to him. (*Id.* at 14–15.) The Irvine Police Department ("IPD") was called, and eventually escorted Defendant out of the building. (*Id.* at 15.) On November 20, 2014, the Bluestone CEO gave the laptop to the company's attorney. (*Id.*) At some point after, Defendant again requested the laptop be returned to him, resulting in an IPD officer taking possession of the laptop on December 9, 2014. (*Id.* at 20–21.) At that time, Bluestone told the IPD that the laptop contained stolen company files. (*Id.*)

Also, on November 20, 2014, the Bluestone CEO had reported Defendant's alleged actions to the FBI on a public access line. (Dkt. 36-3.) During the FBI's investigation into the matter, a FBI Special Agent applied for and obtained a warrant to seize and search the laptop whose ownership was disputed by Defendant and Bluestone, and which was in IPD's custody. (FBI Search Warrant Ex. A.) The warrant relied on an Affidavit executed by FBI Special Agent Todd Munoz. (*Id.* at 1.) Magistrate Judge Jay C. Gandhi signed the warrant for the laptop on December 11, 2014. (*Id.*) The parties dispute whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. (Mot. at 13–16; Opp. at 18–23.)

Based on this warrant, the FBI seized the laptop from IPD custody and searched it. (Opp. at 9.) The seized laptop's serial number was C02HX6SMDKQ5, (FBI Search Warrant at 21), the same serial number as the July laptop, (Niravanh Decl. Ex. 1). The evidence seized from the July laptop corroborated the other evidence the FBI had obtained showing that Defendant had hacked into Bluestone's systems and deleted files, causing damage to the company. (Opp. at 9.) On March 24, 2016, a grand jury returned a single-count indictment against Defendant, charging him with unauthorized impairment of a protected computer, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), (c)(4)(B)(i),

(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). (Dkt. 1.)

2

1

#### III. DISCUSSION

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects against unlawful searches and seizures. "In order to contest the legality of a search or seizure, the defendant must establish that he or she had a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' in the place searched or in the property seized." United States v. Kovac, 795 F.2d 1509, 1510 (9th Cir. 1986). "The term 'standing' is often used to describe an inquiry into who may assert a particular fourth amendment claim. Fourth amendment standing is quite different, however, from 'case or controversy' determinations of article III standing. Rather, it is a matter of substantive fourth amendment law; to say that a party lacks fourth amendment standing is to say that his reasonable expectation of privacy has not been infringed." United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). A defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy if he can "demonstrate a subjective expectation that his activities would be private, and he must show that his expectation was one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting *United States v. Nerber*, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000)). For the purpose of a suppression hearing, a defendant "has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rakas v. United States, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.1 (1978)).

2324

25

26

27

28

Under Ninth Circuit law, a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in stolen property. "The Fourth Amendment does not protect a defendant from a warrantless search of property that he stole, because regardless of whether he expects to maintain privacy in the contents of the stolen property, such an expectation is not one that 'society is prepared to accept as reasonable." *Caymen*, 404 F.3d at 1200 (quoting *Smith* 

v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). "A legitimate expectation of privacy means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered." *Id.* (holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a laptop he fraudulently obtained). Indeed, in *United States v. Wong*, 334 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that a person lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a laptop computer he stole from his former employer. In *Wong*, the evidence showed that the laptop searched belonged to the defendant's former employer, and that the defendant had stolen the laptop. *Id.* at 839. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the defendant "d[id] not have standing to object to the search of that laptop because he failed to establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it." *Id.* (citing *United States v. Cormier*, 220 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item in which he has no possessory or ownership interest)).

Here, like in *Wong*, Defendant stole the laptop at issue from his former employer. So, Defendant lacks standing to object to the search and seizure of that laptop as he has failed to establish that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The undisputed evidence shows that the laptop searched belonged to UCI. Regardless of any possessory interest Defendant may have in the July laptop, he lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. "[O]ne who takes property by theft or fraud cannot reasonably expect to retain possession and exclude others from it once he is caught. Whatever expectation of privacy he might assert is not a legitimate expectation that society is prepared to honor." *Caymen*, 404 F.3d at 1201. And whatever possessory interest Defendant may have in the July laptop "is subordinate to the rights of the owner," UCI. *Id.* at 1200 (citing *Terry v. Enomoto*, 723 F.2d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 1984)). The rightful owner of the July laptop, UCI, consented to the FBI's search of that laptop. (*See* Dkt. 36-1.)

28 || ,

Case 8:16-cr-00036-CJC Document 39 Filed 05/04/18 Page 8 of 8 Page ID #:324

Defendant has submitted no evidence or made any argument to dispute that he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the July laptop. Defendant did not address his possessory or ownership interest in the July laptop in his declaration or briefing on this motion. (See generally Mot., Polequeptewa Decl.) Indeed, Defendant does not even assert that he owns the July laptop, but only states that he "told the deputy that the computer was not Bluestone's property." (Polequeptewa Decl. ¶ 8.) In his reply, Defendant acknowledges the Government's argument that UCI owns the July laptop, but argues that the BSO deputies that arrived at his Florida hotel room "appeared on behalf of Bluestone, not UCI," and that he was advised that "there were allegations that he was committing fraud on a laptop computer belonging to Bluestone, not UCI." (Dkt. 37 at 2– 3.) Defendant also argues that he has always maintained the July laptop does not belong to Bluestone, and that "[a]t the time the computer was seized, there was at least an appearance that Defendant owned and/or possessed the computer." (Id.) But Defendant does not contest that UCI is the rightful owner of the July laptop or that he failed to return UCI's property despite UCI's efforts to obtain it from him. Simply put, Defendant lacks standing to object to the search and seizure of the July laptop.<sup>2</sup>

#### IV. CONCLUSION

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to suppress evidence is DENIED.<sup>3</sup>

DATED: May 4, 2018

CORMAC J. CARNEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

<sup>2</sup> Recause De

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Because Defendant lacks standing to challenge the search and seizure of the July laptop, the Court need not reach his arguments regarding the constitutionality of the search and seizure of that laptop.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court also **GRANTS** the Government's *ex parte* application precluding the need for the appearance of the Government's declarants. (Dkt. 38.)

```
1
                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 2
           CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - SOUTHERN DIVISION
 3
             HONORABLE CORMAC J. CARNEY, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
 4
 5
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
 6
                       Plaintiff,
                                             CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
             VS.
                                            Case No.
                                            8:16-cr-00036-CJC-1
 8
   NIKISHNA POLEQUAPTEWA,
                                            Volume I
 9
                       Defendant.
10
11
12
13
                   REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
                            JURY TRIAL - DAY 5
14
15
                        TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2018
16
                                 8:40 A.M.
17
                           SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA
18
19
20
21
22
23
                     DEBBIE HINO-SPAAN, CSR 7953, CRR
24
                     FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
                    411 WEST FOURTH STREET, ROOM 1-191
25
                     SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA 92701-4516
                           dhinospaan@yahoo.com
```

1	MR. KHOURI: Your Honor, the defense rests.
2	THE COURT: Very well. Anything further from the
3	government?
4	MR. MITTAL: No, Your Honor.
10:24AM 5	THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, I
6	think what makes sense is, then, why don't we go right into
7	jury instructions.
8	Melissa, do you have copies of all the jury instructions?
9	THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: I have to get them in
10:24AM 10	chambers.
11	THE COURT: All right. Why don't we just take an
12	in-place break, ladies and gentlemen. Please stand and
13	stretch. We have those jury instructions in chambers. Melissa
14	will go get them for us.
10:24AM 15	(Brief pause.)
16	THE COURT: We'll go back on the record. Melissa is
17	now distributing the jury instructions.
18	Ladies and gentlemen, please get comfortable. The law
19	requires that I read these instructions to you. You've been
10:26AM 20	each given a copy. And it is your copy that you can take back
21	to your deliberations. Please feel free to write on it if you
22	want. It's, again, your copy. (Reading:)
23	(Jury Instructions)
24	"Members of the jury, now that you have heard
10:27AM 25	all the evidence, it is my duty to instruct you on

the law that applies to this case. A copy of these instructions will be available in the jury room for you to consult.

"It is your duty to weigh and to evaluate all the evidence received in the case and, in that process, to decide the facts. It is also your duty to apply the law as I give it to you to the facts as you find them, whether you agree with the law or not.

"You must decide the case solely on the evidence and the law and must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices, or sympathy. You should also not be influenced by any person's race, color, religion, national ancestry, or gender. You will recall that you took an oath promising to do so at the beginning of the case.

"You must follow all these instructions and do not single out some and ignore others. They are all important. Please do not read into these instructions or into anything I may have said or done any suggestion as to what verdict you should return. That is a matter entirely up to you.

"The First Superseding Indictment is not evidence. The defendant has pleaded not guilty to

10:27AM 10

10:27AM

11

12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

13

14

10:27AM 15

16 17

18

19

10:27AM 20

21

22

23

10:28AM 25

1	the charge. The defendant is presumed to be
2	innocent unless and until the government proves the
3	defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
4	"In addition, the defendant does not have to
10:28AM 5	testify or present any evidence. The defendant
6	does not have to prove innocence. The government
7	has the burden of proving every element of the
8	charge beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant in a
9	criminal case has a constitutional right not to
10:28AM 10	testify. In arriving at your verdict, the law
11	prohibits you from considering in any manner that
12	the defendant did not testify.
13	"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof
14	that leaves you firmly convinced the defendant is
10:28АМ 15	guilty. It is not required that the government
16	prove guilt beyond all possible doubt.
17	"A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon
18	reason and common sense and is not based purely on
19	speculation. It may arise from a careful and
10:29AM 20	impartial consideration of all the evidence or from
21	lack of evidence.
22	"If, after a careful and partial
23	consideration of all the evidence, you are not
24	convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
10:29AM 25	defendant is guilty, it is your duty to find the

1 defendant not guilty. On the other hand, if, after 2 a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you are convinced beyond a reasonable 3 4 doubt that the defendant is quilty, it is your duty 5 to find the defendant guilty. 10:29AM "The evidence you are to consider in deciding 6 7 what the facts are consists of, one, the sworn testimony of any witness; two, the exhibits 8 9 received in evidence; and, three, any facts to 10:29AM 10 which the parties have agreed. 11 "In reaching your verdict, you may consider 12 only the testimony and exhibits received in 1.3 evidence. The following things are not evidence, 14 and you may not consider them in deciding what the 10:29AM 15 facts are: 16 "One, questions, statements, objections, and arguments by the lawyers are not evidence. The 17 18 lawyers are not witnesses. Although you must consider a lawyer's questions to understand the 19 10:30AM 20 answers of a witness, the lawyers' questions are 21 not evidence. 22 "Similarly, what the lawyers have said in 23 their opening statements, will say in their closing 2.4 arguments and at other times is intended to help 10:30AM 25 you interpret the evidence, but it is not evidence.

1 If the facts, as you remember them, differ from the 2 way the lawyers state them, your memory of them 3 controls. 4 "Two, any testimony that I have excluded, 5 stricken, or instructed you to disregard is not 10:30AM evidence. 6 7 "Three, anything you may have seen or heard when the Court was not in session is not evidence. 8 9 You are to decide the case solely on the evidence 10:30AM 10 received at the trial. 11 "Certain charts and summaries have been admitted into evidence. Charts and summaries are 12 1.3 only as good as the underlying supporting material. You should, therefore, give them only such weight 14 as you think the underlying material deserves. 10:30AM 15 "The parties have agreed to certain facts 16 that have been stated to you. Those facts are now 17 18 conclusively established. "Evidence may be direct or circumstantial. 19 10:31AM 20 Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as testimony by a witness about what that witness 21 22 personally saw or heard or did. Circumstantial 23 evidence is indirect evidence. That is, it is 2.4 proof of one or more facts from which you can find 10:31AM 25 another fact.

# Case 8:16-cr-00036-CJC Document 159 Filed 01/25/19 Page 80 of 131 Page ID #:2491

1	
1	"You are to consider both direct and
2	circumstantial evidence. Either can be used to
3	prove any fact. The law makes no distinction
4	between the weight to be given to either direct or
10:31AM 5	circumstantial evidence. It is for you to decide
6	how much weight to give to any evidence.
7	"In deciding the facts in this case, you may
8	have to decide which testimony to believe and which
9	testimony not to believe. You may believe
10:31AM 10	everything a witness says or part of it or none of
11	it.
12	"In considering the testimony of any witness,
13	you may take into account:
14	"No. 1, the opportunity and ability of the
10:31AM 15	witness to see or hear or know the things testified
16	to;
17	"No. 2, the witness's memory;
18	"No. 3, the witness's manner while
19	testifying;
10:32AM 20	"No. 4, the witness's interest in the outcome
21	of the case, if any;
22	"No. 5, the witness's bias or prejudice, if
23	any;
24	"6, whether other evidence contradicted the
10:32AM 25	witness's testimony;

1	"7, the reasonableness of the witness's
2	testimony in light of all the evidence;
3	"and, 8, any other factors that bear on
4	believability.
10:32AM 5	"Sometimes a witness may say something that
6	is not consistent with something else he or she
7	said. Sometimes different witnesses will give
8	different versions of what happened. People often
9	forget things or make mistakes in what they
10:32AM 10	remember. Also, two people may see the same event
11	but remember it differently. You may consider
12	these differences, but do not decide that testimony
13	is untrue just because it differs from other
14	testimony.
10:32AM 15	"However, if you decide that a witness has
16	deliberately testified untruthfully about something
17	important, you may choose not to believe anything
18	that witness said. On the other hand, if you think
19	the witness testified untruthfully about some
10:33AM 20	things but told the truth about others, you may
21	accept the part you think is true and ignore the
22	rest.
23	"The weight of the evidence as to a fact does
24	not necessarily depend on the number of witnesses
10:33AM 25	who testify. What is important is how believable

the witnesses were and how much weight you think their testimony deserves.

"You've heard testimony that the defendant made a statement. It is for you to decide whether the defendant made the statement and, if so, how much weight to give to it. In making those decisions, you should consider all the evidence about the statement including the circumstances under which the defendant may have made it.

"You have heard testimony from persons who, because of education or experience, were permitted to state opinions and the reasons for their opinions. Such opinion testimony should be judged like any other testimony. You may accept it or reject it and give it as much weight as you think it deserves considering the witness's education and experience, the reasons given for the opinion, and all of the other evidence in the case.

"You are here only to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the charge in the First Superseding Indictment. The defendant is not on trial for any conduct or offense not charged in the First Superseding Indictment.

"The First Superseding Indictment charges that the offense alleged in Count One was committed

10:34AM 20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

11

12

1.3

14

16

17

18

19

21

22

10:33AM 10

10:33AM 15

10:33AM

1 on or about a certain date. Although it is 2 necessary for the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on 3 a date reasonably near the date alleged in Count 4 5 One of the First Superseding Indictment, it is not 10:34AM necessary for the government to prove that the 6 7 offense was committed precisely on the date 8 charged. 9 "The defendant is charged in the single-count 10:34AM 10 First Superseding Indictment with intentional 11 damage, without authorization to a protected 12 computer in violation of Section 1030(a)(5)(A) of 1.3 Title 18 of the United States Code. In order for 14 the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, 10:35AM 15 the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 16 17 "First, the defendant knowingly caused the 18 transmission of a program, a code, a command, or information to Blue Stone Strategy Group's Mac Pro 19 10:35AM 20 desktop computer bearing Serial No. F5KMF03YF693; 21 "Second, as a result of the transmission, the 22 defendant intentionally impaired, without 23 authorization, the integrity or availability of 2.4 data, a program, a system, or information; 10:35AM 25 "And, third, Blue Stone Strategy Group's

1 Mac Pro desktop computer bearing Serial No. 2 F5KMF03YF693 was used in or affected interstate or 3 foreign commerce or communication. 4 "The term 'computer' means electronic, 5 magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other 10:36AM high-speed data processing device performing 6 7 logical, arithmetic, or storage functions and includes any data storage facility or 8 9 communications facility directly related to or 10:36AM 10 operating in conjunction with such device. But 11 such term does not include an automated typewriter 12 or typesetter, a portable handheld calculator, or 1.3 other similar device. "An act is done knowingly if the defendant is 14 10:36AM 15 aware of the act and does not act or fails to act 16 through ignorance, mistake, or accident. 17 government is not required to prove that the 18 defendant knew that his acts or omissions were unlawful. You may consider evidence of the 19 10:37AM 20 defendant's words, acts, or omissions along with all the other evidence in deciding whether the 21 22 defendant acted knowingly. 23 "A person acts without authorization with 2.4 respect to the integrity or availability of data, a 10:37AM 25 program, a system, or information on a computer

1 when the person has not received permission from 2 the owner, person who, or entity which controls 3 that right of access to the computer to impair the 4 integrity or availability of data, a program, a 10:37AM 5 system, or information on the computer or when the owner, person who, or entity which controls the 6 7 right of access to the computer has withdrawn or 8 rescinded permission to impair the integrity or 9 availability of data, a program, a system, or 10:37AM 10 information on the computer and the person impairs 11 the integrity or availability of data, a program, a 12 system, or information on the computer anyway. 1.3 "If you find the defendant guilty of the 14 charge in Count One of the First Superseding 10:38AM 15 Indictment, you are then to determine whether the 16 government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that, as a result of such conduct, in a related course of 17 18 conduct affecting one or more other computers used 19 in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 10:38AM 20 communication, the defendant caused 'loss' to Blue 21 Stone Strategy Group during any one-year period of 22 an aggregate value of \$5,000 or more. 23 "The term loss means any reasonable cost to 2.4 Blue Stone Strategy Group including the cost of 10:38AM 25 responding to an offense, conducting a damage

#### Case 8:16-cr-00036-CJC Document 159 Filed 01/25/19 Page 86 of 131 Page ID #:2497

1 assessment, and restoring the data, program, 2 system, or information to its condition prior to 3 the offense and any revenue loss, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of 4 5 interruption of service. Your decision as to whether the loss was \$5,000 or more must be 6 7 unanimous. "When you begin your deliberations, elect one 8 9 member of the jury as your foreperson who will preside over the deliberations and speak for you 11 here in court. You will then discuss the case with 12 your fellow jurors to reach agreement if you can do 1.3 so. 14 "Your verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, must be unanimous. Each of you must decide the 16 case for yourself, but you should do so only after 17 you have considered all the evidence, discussed it 18 fully with the other jurors, and listened to the 19 views of your fellow jurors.

"Do not be afraid to change your opinion if the discussion persuades you that you should. do not come to a decision simply because other jurors think it is right. It is important that you attempt to reach a unanimous verdict, but, of course, only if each of you can do so after having

10:38AM 10:39AM 10 10:39AM 15 10:39AM 20 21 22 23 2.4 10:39AM 25

1 made your own conscientious decision. Do not 2 change an honest belief about the weight and effect 3 of the evidence simply to reach a verdict. 4 "Because you must base your verdict only on 10:40AM 5 the evidence received in the case and on these instructions, I remind you that you must not be 6 7 exposed to any other information about the case or 8 to the issues it involves. Except for discussing 9 the case with your fellow jurors during your 10:40AM 10 deliberations, do not communicate with anyone in 11 any way and do not let anyone else communicate with 12 you in any way about the merits of the case or 1.3 anything to do with it. "This includes discussing the case in person, 14 10:40AM 15 in writing, by phone, or electronic means via 16 e-mail, text messaging, or any Internet chat room, 17 blog, website, or other feature. This applies to 18 communicating with your fellow members, your 19 employer, the media or press, and the people 10:40AM 20 involved in the trial. 21 "If you are asked or approached in any way 22 about your jury service or anything about this 23 case, you must respond that you have been ordered

2.4

to the Court.

10:40AM 25

not to discuss the matter and to report the contact

•	
1	"Do not read, watch, or listen to any news or
2	media accounts or commentary about the case or
3	anything to do with it. Do not do any research,
4	such as consulting dictionaries, searching the
10:41AM 5	Internet, or using other reference materials. And
6	do not make any investigation or in any other way
7	try to learn about the case on your own.
8	"The law requires these instructions to
9	ensure the parties have a fair trial based on the
10:41AM 10	same evidence that each party has had an
11	opportunity to discuss. A juror who violates these
12	restrictions jeopardizes the fairness of these
13	proceedings, and a mistrial could result that would
14	require the entire trial process to start over. If
10:41AM 15	any juror is exposed to any outside information,
16	please notify the Court immediately.
17	"Some of you have taken notes during the
18	trial. Whether or not you took notes, you should
19	rely on your own memory of what was said. Notes
10:41AM 20	are only to assist your memory. You should not be
21	overly influenced by your notes or those of your
22	fellow jurors.
23	"The punishment provided by law for this
24	crime is for the Court to decide. You may not
10:41AM 25	consider punishment in deciding whether the

government has proved its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

"A verdict form has been prepared for you.

After you have reached a unanimous agreement on a verdict, your foreperson should complete the verdict form according to your deliberations, sign and date it, and advise the bailiff that you are ready to return to the courtroom.

"If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a note through the bailiff signed by any one or more of you. No member of the jury should ever attempt to communicate with me except by a signed writing, and I will respond to the jury concerning the case only in writing or here in open court.

"If you send out a question, I will consult with the lawyers before answering it, which may take some time. You may continue your deliberations while waiting for the answer to any question. Remember that you are not to tell anyone, including me, how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on any question submitted to you, including the question of the guilt of the defendant, until after you have reached a unanimous verdict or have been discharged."

#### Case 8:16-cr-00036-CJC Document 159 Filed 01/25/19 Page 90 of 131 Page ID #:2501

1 All right, ladies and gentlemen. Those are the jury 2 instructions. As I indicated, we do have a verdict form we 3 prepared for you. I'm going to walk you through it. I'm hoping it's pretty simple and straightforward. 5 There's really only two questions that are on the form. 10:43AM And how you answer the first question will depend if you even 6 7 have to answer the second question. The first question is: 8 9 "We, the jury in the above-captioned case, 10:43AM 10 unanimously find the defendant, Nikishna 11 Polequaptewa, " and then you have to indicate and 12 check either "not quilty" or "quilty," "of 13 intentionally causing damage, without 14 authorization, to a protected computer in violation 10:43AM 15 of 18 U.S.C., Section 1030(a)(5)(A) as charged in Count One of the First Superseding Indictment." 16 17 So that's the first question. 18 And then the next paragraph, which I won't read, says 19 exactly what I told you. If you answer not quilty, then the 10:44AM 20 foreperson will just date and sign the verdict form. If you 21 unanimously agree that the government has met its burden and 22 find the defendant guilty, then you need to answer the second 23 question on the next page, which asks: 2.4 "We, the jury, in the above-captioned case, 10:44AM 25 having found the defendant guilty of the offense

# Case 8:16-cr-00036-CJC Document 159 Filed 01/25/19 Page 91 of 131 Page ID #:2502

1		
1	charged in Count One of the First Superseding	
2	Indictment, further unanimously find that the	
3	government" and then you need to say "did not"	
4	or "did" "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that,	
10:44AM 5	as a result of such conduct, in a related course of	
6	conduct, affecting one or more other computers used	
7	in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or	
8	communication, the defendant caused loss to Blue	
9	Stone Strategy Group during any one period of an	
10:45am 10	aggregate value of \$5,000 or more."	
11	All right, ladies and gentlemen. That is the verdict	
12	form. It is a quarter till. I suggest we get into closing	
13	arguments.	
14	Mr. Mittal, are you going to be giving the initial	
10:45AM 15	closing?	
16	MR. MITTAL: Yes, Your Honor.	
17	THE COURT: Do you need a couple minutes to set up?	
18	MR. MITTAL: Yes. We need to go into the well and	
19	the computer.	
10:45AM 20	THE COURT: Okay. While they're setting up, ladies	
21	and gentlemen, if you'd like to stand and stretch, please do	
22	so.	
23	MR. MITTAL: Your Honor, may I proceed?	
24	THE COURT: Please do so.	
10:46AM 25	///	