

**IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN**

Susan Doxtator, Arlie Doxtator, and
Sarah Wunderlich, as Special
Administrators of the Estate of Jonathon
C. Tubby,

Case No. 1:19-cv-00137-WCG

Plaintiffs,

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.

Erik O'Brien, Andrew Smith, Todd J.
Delain, Heidi Michel, City of Green
Bay, Brown County, Joseph P. Mleziva,
Nathan K. Winisterfer, Thomas Zeigle,
and John Does 1-5,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Susan Doxtator ("Sue Doxtator"), Arlie Doxtator, and Sarah Wunderlich (collectively "Plaintiffs"), in their capacities as the special administrators of the Estate of Jonathon C. Tubby, as and for their Third Amended Complaint against Erik O'Brien, Andrew Smith, Todd J. Delain, Heidi Michel, the City of Green Bay, Brown County, Joseph P. Mleziva, Nathan K. Winisterfer, Thomas Zeigle, and John Does 1-5, allege and state as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. On October 19, 2018, Jonathon Tubby, a twenty-six year old resident of Green Bay, Wisconsin, was shot multiple times by a Green Bay police officer, including in the head, while Mr. Tubby was unarmed, in handcuffs, face-down, and restrained by a

police canine, while in the “sally port” of the Brown County jail. The shooting was observed by several Green Bay police officers and Brown County sheriff deputies and/or correctional officers, who failed to intervene. The shooting of an unarmed and restrained man by a police officer at the jail is an egregious violation of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs, the personal representatives of Mr. Tubby’s estate, bring this civil action to vindicate his constitutional rights.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This is an action for civil damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon violations of Mr. Tubby’s rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction in this Court exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 based on violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims arising under the United States Constitution. Supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For all state law claims asserted below, Plaintiffs have complied with the notice requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80.

3. This Court has personal jurisdiction over all Defendants because they have substantial contacts with and/or are domiciled within this District.

4. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) in that “a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred” in this District.

PARTIES

5. At the time of his death, Jonathon Tubby was a resident of Green Bay, Wisconsin.

6. Plaintiffs Sue Doxtator, Arlie Doxtator, and Sarah Wunderlich were appointed Special Administrators of Mr. Tubby's estate pursuant to Letters of Special Administration dated December 7, 2018 in the probate matter captioned *In the Matter of the Estate of Jonathon C. Tubby*, 2018-PR-000428, in Brown County Circuit Court. Under the Letters of Special Administration, Sue Doxtator, Arlie Doxtator, and Sarah Wunderlich were jointly granted all the same powers, duties, and liabilities as a Personal Representative for Mr. Tubby's estate.

7. Sue Doxtator and Arlie Doxtator are residents of Seymour, Wisconsin.

8. Sarah Wunderlich is a resident of Green Bay, Wisconsin.

9. At the time of Jonathon Tubby's death, Defendant Erik O'Brien was a police officer employed by the Green Bay Police Department. Officer O'Brien is sued in his individual capacity.

10. Defendant Andrew Smith is the Chief of Police of the Green Bay Police Department, and in his official capacity is responsible for the hiring, training, and supervision of Defendant O'Brien and the Defendant John Doe police officers employed by the Green Bay Police Department who were present during the shooting of Jonathon Tubby. Defendant Smith is sued in his official capacity.

11. Defendant Todd J. Delain is the Sheriff of Brown County, Wisconsin, and in his official capacity is responsible for the operation of the Brown County Jail, and the hiring, training, and supervision of Defendant Heidi Michel, Defendants Mleziva, Winisterfer, Zeigle, and Thomas, and the Defendant John Doe sheriff deputies and

correctional officers employed by the Brown County Sherriff's Department who were present during the shooting of Mr. Tubby. Delain is sued in his official capacity.

12. Defendant Heidi Michel is the Jail Administrator for the Brown County Jail, and is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the jail. Administrator Michel is sued in her official capacity.

13. Defendant City of Green Bay is a municipal corporation with its principal place of business at 100 North Jefferson Street, Green Bay, WI 54301. The City maintains and operates the Green Bay Police Department.

14. Defendant Brown County is a municipal corporation with its principal place of business at 305 E. Walnut Street, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54301. Brown County maintains and operates the Brown County Sherriff's Office and Brown County Jail.

15. Joseph P. Mleziva and Nathan K. Winisterfer are Deputy Brown County Sheriffs. Mleziva and Winisterfer are sued in their individual capacities. Mleziva and Winisterfer were previously named in this action as John Doe defendants.

16. Thomas Zeigle is a Patrol Lieutenant with the Brown County Sheriff's Office. Zeigle is sued in his official and individual capacity. Zeigle was previously named in this action as a John Doe defendant.

17. John Does 1-5 are Green Bay police officers, Brown County sheriffs, and/or Brown County correctional officers who were present at the arrest and/or shooting of Jonathon Tubby on October 19, 2018, or whose actions or failures to act contributed to Mr. Tubby's death. John Does 1-5 are sued in in their individual capacities.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

18. On October 19, 2018, Jonathon Tubby was stopped for a traffic violation by Officers O'Brien and Colton Wernecke of the Green Bay Police Department.

19. During the course of this stop, Officers O'Brien and Wernecke determined that Mr. Tubby had an outstanding warrant for failure to report to the Brown County Jail for a 60-day sentence for Operating While Revoked, a non-violent crime under the laws of the state of Wisconsin.

20. Officers O'Brien and Wernecke handcuffed Mr. Tubby and placed him in their patrol vehicle for transport to the Brown County Jail. Officer Wernecke conducted a search incident to the arrest and handcuffing of Mr. Tubby and determined that he was unarmed. This search was directly observed by Officer O'Brien.

21. After Officers O'Brien and Wernecke's arrival at the jail with Mr. Tubby, Mr. Tubby refused to exit the police squad car that had transported him to the Brown County Jail. Following this refusal, a large number of police officers and sheriff deputies came to the "sally port" of the jail. This included Defendants Mleziva, Winisterfer, Zeigle, and Thomas, as well as the John Doe defendants. The "sally port" is a secured entryway of the jail, where arrestees are transported from a squad car into the jail itself.

22. Neither the Green Bay Police Department nor the Brown County Sheriff's Office had standard procedures or training for removing a non-compliant suspect from a squad car, such as by use of a negotiator or non-lethal force. As a result of the lack of training, a disagreement emerged between the Green Bay Police Department and Brown County Sheriff's Office concerning how to remove Mr. Tubby from the squad car.

Eventually, against the suggestion of the ranking SWAT officer of the Green Bay Police Department, Defendant Zeigle and Green Bay Police Officers present at the scene decided to break the back window of the squad car and mace Mr. Tubby.

23. After Mr. Tubby was maced, he exited the squad car and he was shot by a “bean bag” gun and bitten by a police canine. Due to the force of the “bean bag” projectile or canine, or both, Mr. Tubby fell to the ground. As he did so, Mr. Tubby’s hands were clearly visible and he was clearly unarmed. Nonetheless, while Mr. Tubby lay face-down on the ground, in handcuffs and restrained by a police canine, Officer O’Brien fired multiple shots from close range at Mr. Tubby, killing him. These shots by Officer O’Brien struck Mr. Tubby in the back of the head, back of the neck, and back.

24. At the time, Officer O’Brien drew his gun and fired at Mr. Tubby, Defendants Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 were in close proximity to O’Brien. Yet, none of these Defendants intervened to prevent O’Brien from using deadly force against the unarmed, handcuffed man.

25. At all times Defendants Officers O’Brien, Mleziva, Winisterfer, Zeigle, Dernbach, and John Does 1-5 were acting under color of state law.

COUNT I—Unconstitutional Use of Deadly Force—42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Against Defendant O’Brien)

26. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 25 above, as if fully set forth below.

27. Officer O’Brien’s use of deadly force against an unarmed, handcuffed man constitutes a violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.

Constitution. The use of deadly force against unarmed, handcuffed man by a police officer employed by the City of Green Bay constitutes an unreasonable seizure, a deprivation of Mr. Tubby's right of liberty without due process of law, a violation of his bodily integrity in violation of his right to substantive due process, and cruel and unusual punishment.

28. At the time Officer O'Brien use of deadly force, Officer O'Brien was acting under the color of law. O'Brien's ability to shoot Mr. Tubby multiple times, including in the head, while Mr. Tubby was unarmed, handcuffed, restrained by a police canine, and face-down on the ground was made possible only because O'Brien was clothed with the authority of a Green Bay police officer.

29. At the time of Officer O'Brien's use of deadly force, no reasonable officer in his position would have believed deadly force was justified. It was clearly established at the time of Mr. Tubby's death that an officer may use deadly force only when a reasonable officer, under the same circumstances, would believe that a suspect's actions placed the officer or others in the immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or serious harm. At the time of Mr. Tubby's death, he was handcuffed, unarmed, restrained by a police canine, and face-down on the ground. No reasonable officer could have believed that Mr. Tubby's actions placed the officer or others in the immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or serious harm.

30. The conduct of Officer O'Brien thus violated clearly established rights of Mr. Tubby of which reasonable officers knew or should have known.

31. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Officer O'Brien described above, committed in reckless disregard of Mr. Tubby's rights, Mr. Tubby and Plaintiffs have been damaged in various respects, including but not limited to the deprivation of Mr. Tubby of his life and his pre-death pain and suffering and pecuniary loss, all resulting from and attributable to the deprivation of his constitutional and statutory rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

32. As a result of Officer O'Brien's violations of Mr. Tubby's constitutional rights, Mr. Tubby's estate is entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial and Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will prevent other incidents of deadly force by Green Bay police officers.

COUNT II—Failure to Intervene—42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Against Defendants Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5)

33. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 32 above, as if fully set forth below.

34. Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 owed Mr. Tubby a duty to intervene if another officer used excessive force on him.

35. Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 could see Officer O'Brien draw his gun and begin firing at Mr. Tubby, and knew that Officer O'Brien was about to use deadly force against Mr. Tubby by shooting him multiple times, including in the head. Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 knew that the use of deadly force by Officer O'Brien would violate clearly established rights of Mr. Tubby of which reasonable

officers knew or should have known, as Mr. Tubby did not pose a risk of imminent danger of death or serious harm to Officer O'Brien or any others in the immediate vicinity because Mr. Tubby was unarmed, handcuffed, and restrained by a police canine.

36. Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 were present in close proximity to Officer O'Brien and had a realistic opportunity to take steps to prevent Officer O'Brien from shooting Mr. Tubby.

37. Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 failed to take reasonable steps to prevent Officer O'Brien from shooting Mr. Tubby multiple times in the back and in the head, while Mr. Tubby was unarmed, handcuffed, restrained by a police canine, and face-down on the ground.

38. As a result of Mleziva, Winisterfer, , and John Does 1-5's failure to act, Mr. Tubby was killed by Officer O'Brien.

39. At the time of Officer O'Brien's improper use of deadly force, Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 were acting under the color of law. Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 possessed the power to intervene to prevent violation of Mr. Tubby's constitutional rights by virtue of their authority under state law as police officers, sheriff deputies, and/or correctional officers. They misused this power by failing to intervene.

40. The conduct of Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 thus violated clearly established rights of Mr. Tubby of which reasonable officers knew or should have known.

41. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5 described above, committed in reckless disregard of Mr. Tubby's rights,

Mr. Tubby and Plaintiffs have been damaged in various respects, including but not limited to the deprivation of Mr. Tubby, of his life, and his pre-death pain and suffering and pecuniary loss, all resulting from and attributable to the deprivation of his constitutional and statutory rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

42. As a result of violations of Mr. Tubby's constitutional rights by Mleziva, Winisterfer, and John Does 1-5, Mr. Tubby's estate is entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial and Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will prevent other incidents of deadly force in the presence of Green Bay police officers, Brown County sheriff deputies, and/or Brown County correctional officers.

COUNT III—Failure to Train—42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Against Defendants Smith, Delain, Michel, City of Green Bay, and Brown County)

43. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 44 above, as if fully set forth below.

44. Defendants Smith, Delain, Michel, City of Green Bay, and Brown County failed to train their law enforcement officers on how to remove non-compliant suspects from squad cars.

45. Just as policymakers “know to a moral certainty” that law enforcement officers will be required to arrest fleeing suspects, *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989), Smith, Delain, Michel, Green Bay, and Brown County knew that Green Bay Police Officers and Brown County Sheriff Deputies would encounter suspects

that refuse to exit squad vehicles, particularly at the “sally port.” The nature of the “sally port” is tense—arrestees are at the first point of the transition from ordinary society into jail. As a result, it is obvious that some arrestees may become non-compliant and refuse to exit the squad car that transported them to jail.

46. Despite the highly likelihood of the need to remove a non-compliant suspect from a squad car at the “sally port” area of the jail, none of Smith, Delain, Michel, Green Bay, or Brown County promulgated any policies concerning the constitutional use of force to remove a suspect from a squad car or use of alternatives to force, such as professional negotiators. On information and belief, none of Smith, Delain, Michel, Green Bay, or Brown County provided any training at all concerning the constitutional use of force to remove a suspect from a squad car or use of alternatives to force, such as professional negotiators.

47. Moreover, Brown County knows that its officers will observe excessive use of force by other officers, yet Brown County does not train its officers on intervention to prevent excessive use of force at all.

48. The failure to train officers constitutes deliberate indifference by Smith, Delain, Michel, Green Bay, and Brown County to the constitutional rights of those that will come into contact with police officers and/or sheriff deputies. This deliberate indifference was the moving force behind O’Brien’s use of unconstitutionally excessive and deadly force against Mr. Tubby, and the other officers’ failure to intervene. Without any training on the constitutional use of force to remove a suspect from a squad car, the officers on the scene resorted to using several levels of force, including deadly force,

against Mr. Tubby nearly simultaneously. None of the Brown County officers acted to intervene to prevent this unconstitutional use of force.

49. As a result of the failure to train by Smith, Delain, Michel, Green Bay, and Brown County, Mr. Tubby's estate is entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial and Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will prevent other incidents of deadly force at the Brown County Jail or by Green Bay police officers.

COUNT IV—Excessive Force—42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Against Defendant City of Green Bay)

50. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 49 above, as if fully set forth below.

51. At the time of Officer O'Brien's unconstitutional use of deadly force against Mr. Tubby, the Green Bay Police Department had a custom and practice of using excessive force that was persistent and widespread, so that it was the Green Bay Police Department's standard operating procedure.

52. The Green Bay Police Department's custom and practice of using excessive force was often directed to unarmed individuals, like Mr. Tubby, and was rationalized and excused by police officers, and the Department, by pointing to innocuous actions by the unarmed individuals and claiming that such actions were suspicious or dangerous.

53. For example, on February 26, 2017, Green Bay police officers used excessive force on an unarmed man during a traffic stop. A Green Bay Police Officer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle. After a passenger exited the vehicle, he reached to pull up his pants and two Green Bay Police Officers used Tasers on the man three times

without warning. A third Officer then violently tackled the man. The Officers involved subsequently claimed they thought the man was reaching for a weapon when he was simply pulling up his pants.

54. As another example, in 2010, Green Bay Police Officers used a baton, shackles, and bodily force against a man inside his own apartment, injuring his head, face, and neck. The City of Green Bay agreed to pay monetary damages to the man as a result of the wrongful conduct by the Officers involved.

55. As another example, in April 2014, a man directed profanity toward a Green Bay Police Officer but posed no physical threat. The Green Bay Police Officer slammed the man against a squad car, threw him to the ground, and continued to beat him while the man lay on the ground. A complaint was lodged but the Green Bay Police Department concluded that the Officer acted appropriately.

56. As another example, on April 21, 2007 four Green Bay Police Officers shot and killed Ben Sonnenberg as he was exiting his vehicle. Sonnenberg was unarmed. However, the shooting officers were not disciplined by Green Bay because they claimed, without any corroboration, that they heard a shot and mistook a cell phone in Sonnenberg's hand for a firearm.

57. As another example, in December 2017, a Green Bay Police Officer arrested a woman in downtown Green Bay. When the woman reached for identification from her purse, the Officer involved tackled her to the ground, causing her to sustain a concussion and broken facial bones. The Green Bay Police Department then claimed the

woman's injuries were the result of her own intoxication and not the excessive force used against her.

58. As another example, in January 2018, a man, a self-proclaimed First Amendment auditor, was video recording public spaces of the Green Bay Police Department. A Green Bay Police Lieutenant confronted the man, who was doing nothing illegal, and used excessive physical force against him.

59. Defendant Chief of Police Smith, or his predecessors, knew of this pattern of excessive force and allowed it to continue. Smith and his predecessors took no action, or took inadequate action, to discipline the Police Officers involved.

60. Based on the foregoing, the Green Bay Police Department has a custom and practice of excessive force, which was a moving force behind O'Brien's decision to shoot and kill Mr. Tubby while Mr. Tubby lay handcuffed and unarmed on the ground. Had O'Brien believed that his shooting of Mr. Tubby would be disciplined or severely sanctioned by the Green Bay Police Department, he would not have used lethal force against Mr. Tubby, an arrestee who was lying face-down on the ground in handcuffs while engaged by a police canine and whose empty hands had been clearly visible moments before. Instead, as a result of the Green Bay Police Department's custom and practice of using excessive force, he knew or believed that he could use deadly force and later claim that innocuous activity seemed suspicious or dangerous.

61. As a result of the Green Bay Police Department's custom and practice of using excessive force, Mr. Tubby's estate is entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial and Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will prevent other

incidents of excessive force at the Brown County Jail or by Green Bay Police Officers, such as by enhancing supervision of police officers through the use of body cameras or other means.

COUNT V—State Created Danger—§ 1983

(Against Defendants Zeigle, Brown County, and Green Bay)

62. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 61 above, as if fully set forth below.

63. Defendant Zeigle, a Patrol Lieutenant of the Brown County Sheriff's Office, is a policy-making official of Brown County. Zeigle had final authority over the actions of the law enforcement officers in the sally port on the night of October 19, 2018. Accordingly, when Zeigle ordered officers present in the sally port to use potentially lethal force to break the back window of the squad car, he was announcing a policy of Brown County.

64. Lieutenant Nathan Allen of the Green Bay Police Department is a policy-making official of the Green Bay Police Department. When a Green Bay police officer decided to introduce mace into the squad car, he was assisted by Lieutenant Zeigle and Lieutenant Allen, who were creating policies of Brown County and the Green Bay Police Department.

65. Despite being aware of the plan to break the back window and introduce mace into the squad car, neither Lieutenant Allen nor Lieutenant Zeigle nor any other law enforcement officers privy to the plan shared that plan with the officers establishing a containment perimeter in and around the sally port.

66. The decision to break the back window of a vehicle and spray mace onto a person in a confined space creates a foreseeable risk of serious harm—as a result of being subjected to mace in a confined space, the person will attempt to escape the confined space. As a result of attempting to escape, the person will likely be subjected to the use of force by law enforcement.

67. This risk of serious harm was further increased by the decision of officers not to share the plan to create an escape route and force Mr. Tubby from the vehicle. Officers establishing a perimeter did not know Mr. Tubby would exit the vehicle, and therefore immediately resorted to force once he did exit the vehicle.

68. Zeigle's, Brown County, and Green Bay's culpability in making this decision is reckless and shocks the conscience. The back doors of squad cars cannot be opened from the inside. Therefore, when Police Officers maced Mr. Tubby, he had no reasonable means of escape or surrender. Spraying mace onto a person in a confined space with no reasonable means of escape or surrender is tantamount to torture. Accepted law enforcement practices would call for de-escalation—use of a negotiator, waiting for the suspect to become calm, obtaining visual contact with the suspect through less than lethal means, etc.

69. When the rear window of the squad car was broken, Mr. Tubby began calling for help. His calls for help were not heeded, and no dialog or negotiation with Mr. Tubby was undertaken. Instead, Green Bay Police Officer Eric Allen made the decision to introduce mace into the squad car with assistance from Zeigle and Green Bay Lieutenant Nathan Allen.

70. As a result of spraying mace on Mr. Tubby in a confined space, Mr. Tubby exited the car through the only possible means of escape or surrender, the broken rear window. His decision to exit the car through a broken window made Mr. Tubby more vulnerable to use of force, and in fact several forms of force were deployed against him almost simultaneously. He was shot with a bean bag gun and engaged by a police canine. His attempt to flee also contributed to O'Brien's decision to use deadly force against Mr. Tubby. Accordingly, the officers' decision to break the window and introduce mace proximately caused Mr. Tubby's death, bodily injury, and pain and suffering.

71. As a result of Zeigle, Brown County's, and Green Bay's creation of danger, resulting in O'Brien's use of deadly force, Mr. Tubby's estate is entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial and Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will prevent other incidents of state created danger by Green Bay officers, Brown County officers, or at the Brown County Jail.

COUNT VI—Battery

(Against Defendant O'Brien)

72. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 74 above, as if fully set forth below.

73. O'Brien's shooting of Mr. Tubby, while he lay unarmed face-down on the ground in handcuffs and engaged by a police canine, constituted an unlawful use of force or violence upon Mr. Tubby.

74. O'Brien intentionally directed his shots toward Mr. Tubby.

75. The shots fired at Mr. Tubby caused bodily injury, pain and suffering, and death.

76. As a result of O'Brien's battery, Mr. Tubby's estate is entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial and Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will prevent other incidents of battery at the Brown County Jail or by Green Bay Police Officers.

COUNT VII—Negligence

(Against Defendants O'Brien, City of Green Bay, and Brown County)

77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 76 above, as if fully set forth below.

78. After arresting Mr. Tubby, O'Brien owed Mr. Tubby a duty to use reasonable and ordinary care to protect Mr. Tubby's life and health.

79. O'Brien breached that duty by shooting Mr. Tubby multiple times, including in the head, while Mr. Tubby was unarmed, in handcuffs, face-down, and restrained by a police canine. No reasonable law enforcement officer would have shot Mr. Tubby in the circumstances. O'Brien knew Mr. Tubby was unarmed. He observed the search incident to arrest of Mr. Tubby by Officer Wernecke. Officer Wernecke thoroughly searched Mr. Tubby in accordance with Green Bay Police Department

policies, and conclusively determined that Tubby did not have a weapon. Moreover, at the time he was shot, Tubby was lying face down, on the ground, and was engaged by a police canine.

80. As a result of O'Brien's breach of duty, O'Brien inflicted bodily injury, pain and suffering, and death on Mr. Tubby.

81. O'Brien shot Mr. Tubby while acting within his scope of employment as a Police Officer with the Green Bay Police Department and/or within the scope of his employment as a Police Officer at the request of Brown County within Brown County's jurisdiction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0313.

82. As a result of O'Brien's negligence, Mr. Tubby's estate is entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial and Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief that will prevent other incidents of excessive force at the Brown County Jail or by Green Bay Police Officers.

COUNT VIII—Negligence

(Against Defendants Zeigle, Brown County, and Green Bay)

83. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 82 above, as if fully set forth below.

84. As the Patrol Lieutenant in charge of the sally port, Zeigle owed Mr. Tubby a duty to use reasonable and ordinary care to protect Mr. Tubby's life and health. As a result of Mr. Tubby's arrest by Green Bay Police Officers, Green Bay also owed Mr. Tubby a duty to use reasonable and ordinary care to protect Mr. Tubby's life and health.

85. Zeigle and Green Bay breached this duty when officers present in the sally port used potentially lethal force to break the back window of the squad car and maced Mr. Tubby in a confined space, without sharing the plan to do so with other officers and without heeding his calls for help. Accepted law enforcement standards would have called for officers to engage a professional negotiator, and/or use less than lethal means to obtain visual contact of Mr. Tubby and wait for the situation to de-escalate, particularly after Mr. Tubby called for help when the rear window of the squad was breached. Accepted law enforcement standards would have also called for the plan to be shared with other officers on the scene.

86. As a result of being escalating the situation, i.e., spraying mace on Mr. Tubby in a confined space with no reasonable means of escape or surrender, and ignoring his calls for help, Mr. Tubby became agitated and exited the vehicle through a broken rear window. His agitated state, act of escaping through the rear window, and lack of communication of the plan to force him out of that same window, contributed to O'Brien's decision to use deadly force against Mr. Tubby, and accordingly, Zeigle's and Green Bay's negligence proximately caused Mr. Tubby's death, bodily injury, and pain and suffering.

87. Zeigle made the decision to break the car window and introduce mace into a confined space while acting within his scope of employment as a Patrol Lieutenant with the Brown County Sheriff's Office.

88. As a result of Zeigle's and Green Bay's negligence, Mr. Tubby's estate is entitled to damages in an amount to be determined at trial and Plaintiffs are entitled to

injunctive relief that will prevent other incidents of negligence at the Brown County Jail or by Brown County officers.

COUNT IX—Direct Action—Wis. Stat. § 895.46

(Against City of Green Bay)

89. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 88 above, as if fully set below.

90. The City is responsible and liable under Wis. Stat. § 895.46 to pay any judgment for damages and costs entered against Defendant O'Brien and those Defendant John Doe officers employed by the Green Bay Police Department, because their acts at issue resulting in the death of Mr. Tubby were done within the scope of their employment as City police officers while carrying out their duties as officers and employees of the City.

COUNT X—Direct Action—Wis. Stat. § 895.46

(Against Brown County)

91. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 94 above, as if fully set below.

92. Brown County is responsible and liable under Wis. Stat. § 895.46 to pay any judgment for damages and costs entered against Defendants Mleziva, Winisterfer, Zeigle, Dernbach, and those John Doe sheriff deputies employed by Brown County, because their acts at issue resulting in the death of Mr. Tubby were done within the scope

of their employment as County deputies while carrying out their duties as employees of Brown County.

93. Brown County is responsible under Wis. Stat. § 895.46 to pay any judgment for damages and costs entered against O'Brien to the extent O'Brien was acting as a law enforcement officer within Brown County's jurisdiction at Brown County's request pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0313

RELIEF REQUESTED

Wherefore the Plaintiffs sue for relief as from the Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows:

- A. Actual monetary damages in an amount determined by a jury for each of plaintiffs' causes of action.
- B. The award of punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a jury.
- C. The award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements of this action.
- D. Injunctive relief requiring the City of Green Bay and Brown County to adopt policies regarding the use of force to prohibit the use of lethal force against anyone who is in custody and restrained.
- E. Injunctive relief requiring the City of Green Bay and Brown County to adopt policies regarding the use of force, or alternatives to force, to remove non-compliant individuals from squad cars.
- F. Injunctive relief requiring the City of Green Bay and Brown County to conduct training for all law enforcement officers and correctional staff on the appropriate use of force.
- G. Injunctive relief requiring Green Bay to install, operate, and maintain appropriation audio visual recording equipment to capture and preserve a record of any use of force by police officers.
- H. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff demands trial by jury in this action of all issues so triable.

Dated: February __, 2020

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ___th day of February, 2020, I served the foregoing **THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT** via the Court's CM/ECF system, causing Defendants to be served electronically.

/s/ Forrest Tahdooahnippah
Forrest Tahdooahnippah