

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

No. 14-02

**In the matter of the Petition to Amend/Dissolve
Wisconsin Statute § 801.54 Discretionary
Transfer of Civil Actions to Tribal Court**

FILED

JUL 28, 2016

Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Madison, WI

On July 24, 2014, several individuals who are members of the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, namely, Nona Danforth, Candace Danforth, Kerry Danforth, Linda S. Dallas, and Cathy L. Metoxen filed a rule petition asking the court to repeal Wis. Stat. § 801.54, which governs discretionary transfer of civil actions to tribal court. The petitioners stated broad objections to Wis. Stat. § 801.54 and generally contend that efforts to resolve their concerns with Oneida leadership have been unsuccessful. The court discussed petition 14-02 at an open rules conference on November 17, 2014 and decided to consider petition 14-02 together with a previously scheduled review of the operation of Wis. Stat. § 801.54. See S. Ct. Order 07-11B, 2011 WI 53 (issued Jul. 1, 2011) (Roggensack, J., dissenting).

On March 15, 2015, the court sent a letter to interested persons requesting written comments. Comments were received from a number of individuals and entities pertaining to this petition and to the scheduled review of the operation of Wis. Stat. § 801.54. On November 10, 2015, the court conducted a day long consolidated public

hearing. Ms. Linda A. Dallas presented this petition to the court. Some 18 individuals spoke to the court at that public hearing. Some spoke regarding this petition, some spoke regarding the scheduled review of Wis. Stat. § 801.54, and some of the presenters addressed both petitions.

The court discussed this rule petition in open rules conferences on March 17, 2016, May 12, 2016, and June 21, 2016. While the court sincerely appreciates the concerns and challenges expressed by the petitioners who testified in support of this petition, a majority of the court determined that the concerns expressed by the petitioners were unlikely to be resolved by the relief sought in the petition, namely, repealing or amending Wis. Stat. § 801.54. As a result, the court voted to deny rule petition 14-02. Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack and Justice Rebecca G. Bradley opposed the motion to deny the petition, noting continuing concerns about the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 801.54. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that rule petition 14-02, In the matter of the Petition to Amend/Dissolve Wisconsin Statute § 801.54 Discretionary Transfer of Civil Actions to Tribal Court, is denied.

Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 28th day of July, 2016.

BY THE COURT:

Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court

¶1 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (*dissenting*). On June 21, 2016, for the fourth time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has approved denial of access to Wisconsin courts to those litigants who choose to litigate in Wisconsin circuit courts and subsequently are sent to tribal court without their consent. The court has done so through affirmance of provisions in Wis. Stat. § 801.54 that permit circuit courts to transfer litigation begun in circuit court to tribal court without a determination made on the record of the basis for tribal court concurrent jurisdiction over the persons and the subject matter of the dispute.

¶2 The court was told that the transfers were "working well." While I have no basis on which to conclude that quick transfers to tribal court are not efficient, "working well" is not a basis on which to ground concurrent jurisdiction, nor is it a substitute for the constitutional protections that Wisconsin courts provide to litigants. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the order of the court.

I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On July 1, 2008, pursuant to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's amendment of Wis. Stat. § 801.54, the court legislated to facilitate the transfer of cases pending in circuit court to tribal court without consent of the parties. S. Ct. Order 07-11, 2008 WI 114 (iss. Jul. 31, 2008, eff. Jan. 1, 2009). I dissented from that order because: (1) tribal courts rarely have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over nontribal

members; (2) § 801.54 sets no standards by which a circuit court is to evaluate whether concurrent subject matter exists before transfer can occur; and (3) the court exceeded the legislative authority granted by Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1) when it modified the right of access to Wisconsin courts for litigants who had chosen to proceed in Wisconsin courts. Id., p. 11 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).

¶4 On July 1, 2009, the court again legislated, using its authority under Wis. Stat. § 751.12, to limit the right to litigate in Wisconsin courts. The court did so by giving circuit courts authority to transfer post-judgment child support, custody and placement cases to tribal court without a hearing, when the state is the real party in interest pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.205(2). S. Ct. Order 07-11A, 2009 WI 63 (Jul. 1, 2009). I dissented in 2009 as I had in 2008, for many of the same reasons. Id., p. 1 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). Once again, the concerns I raised were ignored by a majority of the court.

¶5 On July 1, 2011, the court decided to continue tribal court transfers under Wis. Stat. § 801.54 and to conduct a review of tribal court transfers in five years. S. Ct. Order 07-11B, 2011 WI 53 (Jul. 1, 2011). Again, I dissented. I was concerned that this court was closing the doors to circuit courts for both tribal and nontribal members who have a constitutional right of access to Wisconsin courts and to the constitutional protections Wisconsin courts provide. I was

concerned with "[w]ho looks out for the unrepresented litigant whose constitutional rights are not represented in tribal court." Id., p. 5 at ¶6 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).

¶6 On July 24, 2015, six members of the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin filed rule petition 14-02, asking the court to repeal Wis. Stat. § 801.54. The court set rule petition 14-02 for consideration with rule petition 07-11C, its comprehensive review of tribal transfers under § 801.54, which review the court had committed to undertake in 2011.

¶7 On June 21, 2016, Justice Michael J. Gableman moved the court to continue to permit transfers to tribal courts under Wis. Stat. § 801.54, which by implication denied rule petition 14-02.¹ He spoke of his travels throughout the State of Wisconsin where he visited many tribal courts, some while hearings were on-going. He spoke of the care and concern that tribal courts showed to the litigants and others who participated in the proceedings.

¶8 Justice Gableman said that 90 percent to 95 percent of the cases that have been transferred to tribal courts involved child support. He said that child support case transfers are working well for all participants. The work that Justice Gableman did in visiting the tribes and their courts was of significant assistance to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

¹ Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson seconded Justice Michael J. Gableman's motion.

¶9 After a thorough discussion, the court voted to continue Wis. Stat. § 801.54 transfers to tribal courts and to deny rule petition 14-02, with two justices dissenting. I am a dissenting justice, and I now address some of my reasons for dissenting.

II. DISCUSSION

¶10 Our rule-making, through which we created transfers to tribal courts, is a limited grant from the legislature that permits the court to legislate in regard to pleading and practice so long as the rules the court creates do not "abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant." Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1). In my view, the court exceeded the authority the legislature granted when the court enacted, and continues to authorize, tribal transfers under Wis. Stat. § 801.54 because transfers to tribal court affect litigants' substantive right of access to Wisconsin courts and litigants' substantive right to the constitutional protections that our courts provide to all.

¶11 As Justice Kennedy recognized, "[t]he political freedom guaranteed to citizens by the federal structure is a liberty both distinct from and every bit as important as those freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights." United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The same liberty interest is present in access to Wisconsin courts and the structure they afford to litigants.

¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.54 provides in relevant part:

(1) Scope. In a civil action where a circuit court and a court or judicial system of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in Wisconsin ("tribal court") have concurrent jurisdiction, this rule authorizes the circuit court, in its discretion, to transfer the action to the tribal court under sub. (2m) or when transfer is warranted under the factors set forth in sub. (2). This rule does not apply to any action in which controlling law grants exclusive jurisdiction to either the circuit court or the tribal court.

A plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 801.54 shows that before a transfer to tribal court may be made, the circuit court must determine that the tribal court to which transfer is contemplated has concurrent jurisdiction over all parties and over the subject matter of the action.

¶13 Tribal court jurisdiction is established by federal laws and by United States Supreme Court precedent. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851-52 (1985). Therefore, whether a tribal court has adjudicative authority over nontribal members is a federal question; it is not decided by state law or by tribal law. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008). "If the tribal court is found to lack such jurisdiction, any judgment as to the nonmember is necessarily null and void." Id. Therefore, this primary determination is required of the circuit court before the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 801.54 can be engaged.

¶14 Tribal court concurrent jurisdiction over nontribal members is extremely limited. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). As the United States Supreme Court

held in Plains Commerce Bank, tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers for conduct that occurred off tribal land is almost nonexistent, having been upheld in only one circumstance. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 333.

¶15 However, on June 21, 2016, prior to re-authorizing Wis. Stat. § 801.54 transfers to tribal courts, the court did not address which federal law provided concurrent jurisdiction over nontribal litigants. This unaddressed question, which circuit courts are required to answer before employing Wis. Stat. § 801.54, is extremely complicated and for which there is little guidance.

¶16 Furthermore, an additional concern with tribal court transfers is the lack of review of tribal court decisions by nontribal courts. As United States Supreme Court Justice Souter has explained, "[T]here is no effective review mechanism in place to police tribal courts' decisions on matters of non-tribal law, since tribal-court judgments based on state or federal law can be neither removed nor appealed to state or federal courts." Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 385 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).

¶17 Few appellate cases have challenged circuit court transfers to tribal courts; therefore, we do not know if circuit courts are determining that tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the parties and the controversy before transfer is ordered. Only one case has made its way to us,

Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp., 2012 WI 88, 342 Wis. 2d 626, 819 N.W.2d 264.

¶18 Kroner involved a transfer by Brown County Circuit Court to Oneida Tribal Court without John Kroner's consent.² Kroner was not a tribal member. The lead opinion acknowledged that "[t]his case and others like it should focus on the substantive rights of the litigants." Id., ¶64. The lead opinion went on to explain that "one of the parties in this case chose to file suit in Brown County Circuit Court and paid a filing fee to accomplish this objective. Transfer deprives the party of that forum." Id., ¶66. However, the lead opinion did not address the merits of Kroner's right of access to Wisconsin courts. Id., ¶69.

¶19 I wrote in concurrence in Kroner to explain that Wis. Stat. § 801.54 transfers to tribal court required circuit courts to assure that transfer would not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights of litigants. Id., ¶70 (Roggensack, J., concurring). I explained that separation of church and state was one of the foundational principles of our federal and state constitutions, but that tribal courts may incorporate religious

² John Kroner was not a member of the Oneida Tribe, but he had served as the chief executive officer of Oneida Seven Generations Corporation (Seven Generations), which is a tribally owned real estate and holding company. Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp., 2012 WI 88, ¶2, 342 Wis. 2d 626, 819 N.W.2d 264. He was terminated and sued Seven Generations in Brown County Circuit Court, claiming wrongful discharge and breach of contract. Id.

values as custom and tradition that affect tribal courts' views of the law. Id., ¶96 (Roggensack, J., concurring).

¶20 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016), is the most recent United States Supreme Court decision that discusses proceedings in tribal court. Bryant is not on point with all potential transfers because it involves a tribal member, Michael Bryant, and a criminal proceeding in federal court. Id. at 1963. However, the court's discussion of differences between tribal court protections and protections afforded under the United States Constitution is informing.

¶21 Bryant was convicted in federal district court of domestic assault as an habitual offender based in part on prior tribal court convictions for domestic assault. Id. at 1958. The tribal court convictions were employed as a predicate offense in federal court. Id. at 1959. Bryant appealed his federal conviction, challenging the use of prior tribal court convictions because he had been unrepresented in tribal court. Id. at 1958.

¶22 In examining Bryant's contentions, the court explained that "[t]he Bill of Rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, therefore, does not apply in tribal-court proceedings." Id. at 1962. The court further explained that although the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) affords some protections in tribal court, it is not coextensive with the rights secured by the United States Constitution. Id. However, because the Sixth Amendment did not apply in tribal court and

ICRA was in place in Bryant's tribal court proceedings, no violation of his tribal court rights occurred. Id. at 1966. Also, Bryant was punished only for crimes adjudicated in federal court where he was represented by counsel; therefore, his federal convictions were upheld. Id.

¶23 Furthermore, it is important to note that in order to exercise jurisdiction over nontribal persons, "[t]he burden rests on the tribe to establish one of the exceptions to Montana's general rule" that precludes tribal court jurisdiction over nontribal members. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 330. Therefore, determining whether concurrent jurisdiction exists, particularly with regard to nontribal litigants, is an extremely complex problem for which we have given circuit courts no guidance. However, a contention that the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even after judgment. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

¶24 And finally, in accommodating the wishes of Native American Tribes of Wisconsin, a majority of this court contravenes the oath of office that each justice took to protect the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Wisconsin. Although I have great respect for Native American Tribes of Wisconsin and I recognize the extremely valuable services they provide, my respect cannot overcome my constitutional obligations to citizens or expand the authority granted by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 751.12.

Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the order of the court herein.

III. CONCLUSION

¶25 A majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has once again approved denial of access to Wisconsin courts to those litigants who choose to litigate in Wisconsin circuit courts and subsequently are sent to tribal court without their consent. The court has done so through affirmance of Wis. Stat. § 801.54, which permits circuit courts to transfer litigation begun in circuit court to tribal court without a determination made on the record of the basis for tribal court concurrent jurisdiction over the persons and the subject matter of the dispute.

¶26 The court was told that transfers to tribal court were "working well." However, "working well" is not a basis on which to ground concurrent jurisdiction, nor is it a substitute for the constitutional protections that Wisconsin courts provide to litigants. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the order of the court.

¶27 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA G. BRADLEY joins this dissent.

